

ARMORED BATTALION PREPAREDNESS FOR OPERATIONS
OTHER THAN WAR

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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B.S., Longwood College, Farmville, Virginia, 1983

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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ABSTRACT

~~ADEQUACY OF ARMORED BATTALION PREPAREDNESS FOR OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR~~
by Major James E. Cashwell, USA, 74 pages.

This study examines historical examples of armored forces conducting operations other than war (OOTW). From these examples the study then examines current training and doctrine to determine their adequacy in preparing armored battalions for these diverse missions.

OOTW poses numerous challenges for today's armored forces. In times of force reductions and budget restraints armored forces are attempting to remain at both an acceptable level of training for war, and ensure their preparedness for the ever increasing requirements of OOTW. The added dimension of OOTW and the potential for conducting missions that are not directly related to war-fighting creates a dichotomy between training for war, and being able to execute non-war-fighting missions.

The study concludes that the current "Battle Focused" approach to training, provides today's armored forces with a solid platform from which to launch into both war and OOTW. With respect to doctrine, the study finds that due to the recent insertion of OOTW into current army lexicon, OOTW is not well reflected. The study does find however, that because a direct correlation exists between training for war and training for OOTW, current war-fighting doctrine supports a unit's preparation for OOTW.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The post-Cold War United States relies on its armored forces to accomplish many tasks not associated with war fighting. Armored units that once only trained for large-scale maneuver warfare now conduct a range of missions in peacetime to include show of force and peace enforcement operations. As missions change, however, a central concern focuses on the extent to which the respective doctrine and training has kept pace. Efficiently preparing armored forces for operations other than war (OOTW) in times of reduced forces and budgets challenges the US Army as it prepares to enter the twenty-first Century.

Thesis Topic

This thesis assesses US armored battalions conducting operations other than war. The study begins with the evolution of the tank and its role on the battlefield. It analyzes historical cases for OOTW applications and lessons learned, analyzes armored training and doctrine for availability and relevance, and draws conclusions.

Thesis question

Are today's armored battalions trained for the challenges of OOTW? The diversity of these types of operations, the associated additional training requirements and extensive mission variations, put enormous pressure on any type of unit. To answer the question of

whether armored battalions are trained for OOTW, requires the analysis of three supporting questions.

1. Is there a role for armor in OOTW?
2. Do armored battalions adequately train for OOTW?
3. Does existing doctrine provide these units with sufficient information to properly prepare them for such operations?

Scope

The term "Armored Forces" has many meanings. US armored divisions are based principally on the firepower and mobility of the M-1 tank in a combined role with other lighter armored combat vehicles. In addition, today's US Army Armored Cavalry Regiments (ACR) have two distinct organizations. One consists of M1 series tanks with M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFV). The other has the high mobility multi purpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) mounting tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missiles and machine guns. This study is limited to armored units whose main fighting vehicle is the tank. The thesis definition of the tank is: an armor-protected, full-tracked enclosed vehicle that mounts a cannon and automatic weapons and has excellent cross-country mobility, firepower, and the capability of shock action.

FM 100-5, Operations, describes thirteen illustrative activities designated as operations other than war, ranging from noncombatant evacuation to attacks and raids. To further narrow the thesis, and to analyze only the OOTW most relevant to armor applications, eight of the thirteen activities can be eliminated. They are: Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), arms control, humanitarian assistance and

disaster relief, security assistance, nation assistance, combating terrorism, attacks and raids, and support to counter-drug operations. The remaining five activities have varied levels of application to armored forces and are the subjects of this analysis. These are: support to domestic civil authorities, peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement, show of force, and support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. By limiting the scope of analysis to the above definition of the tank, focusing on the six most relevant activities of OOTW, and studying only battalion and smaller sized armored forces, the thesis is more clearly defined and focused.

Thesis Hypothesis

Armored battalions are trained for the challenges of operations other than war (OOTW). Sufficient examples exist to indicate effective employment of armored battalions in OOTW. The current training conducted by armored battalions, supported by the training received at the major training centers, effectively prepares these units for both operations of war and OOTW. Current doctrine, however, is outdated and insufficient for providing OOTW-specific tactical and technical information to armored forces preparing for OOTW.

Literature Review

There are four major categories of literature this study draws upon: print media dealing with world events, doctrinal literature, historical literature, and professional dialogue. Recent world events provide the thesis with up-to-date data for current relevancy. Numerous journals and periodicals provide accurate accounts of OOTW missions.

Doctrinal literature, which prescribes the tactics and techniques for the employment of armored units, includes Army field manuals (FMs), training manuals, and lessons learned from recent operations. Historical data provides the base of analysis on which the thesis is measured. Numerous historical works provide the insight as to how armored units were previously employed in operations now referred to as OOTW. Professional dialogue is distilled from staff and commanders of various armored battalions, command and general staff college (CGSC) staff and faculty insight, and from previous masters of military arts and science (MMAS) thesis on related subjects. Together these sources provide the necessary tools to accomplish this study.

Research Methodology

This thesis is divided into five major chapters. The following discussion summarizes each chapter, provides a quick synopsis of the chapter, and discusses the chapter's relationship to the primary research question.

Chapter 1 - Introduction

This chapter addresses background relevant to the thesis. It analyzes the thesis question from both a current and historical perspective and provides the thesis hypothesis. The chapter also outlines administrative data to include scope of analysis, limitations/delimitations, chapter description and how each chapter works toward answering the thesis question, and lists key terms.

Chapter 2 - Historical Analysis

This chapter centers on historical examples of armored units conducting OOTW. It begins with the study of the tank's evolution and addresses its relationship to the current revolution of military affairs (RMA). To broaden the analysis, both US and foreign country OOTW experience is included. By looking at both US and other countries involvement, the thesis gains both a broader range of experiences from which to draw and obtains additional insight into what is a relatively new field. As the thesis focuses on training and doctrine issues, the analysis looks primarily at US involvement in OOTW. Specific US areas of interest include operations in Vietnam, Panama, and Haiti. This analysis provides a cross sampling of armor involvement not only in different periods of time, but also for varying requirements, countries, geographical conditions, and nationalities. From this historical analysis, lessons learned are extracted and applied in order to assess current unit training and preparedness.

Chapter 3 - Training Analysis

This chapter analyzes current armored battalion training for OOTW missions. The study analyzes how and to what degree armored units integrate OOTW into their Mission Essential Task List (METL) and how much this METL training prepares units for OOTW. The training analysis highlights current strengths and weaknesses that today's armored units face while preparing for operations other than war. The sampling of armored battalions includes rapid deployment forces (RDF) and other units located in the continental United States (CONUS), and forces located outside the continental United States (OCONUS). The chapter

concludes by drawing an analysis between training for war and preparing a unit for OOTW.

Chapter 4 - Doctrinal Analysis

This chapter evaluates the availability of doctrine which supports and prepares armored units for OOTW. Because OOTW has only recently found its way into Army capstone manuals, such as FM 100-5, Operations, the study also looks at army manuals that previously supported operations referred to as low intensity conflict (LIC). This doctrinal analysis shows how current doctrine supports armored units, soldiers, and their leaders for their responsibilities associated with OOTW.

Chapter 5 - Conclusion

The concluding chapter assesses armored units' training preparedness for OOTW. This assessment provides the answers to the following questions:

1. Does a valid role exist for armored units in OOTW?
2. Do armored battalions train the tasks required for successful execution of OOTW?
3. Does existing doctrine provide units sufficient information to prepare for OOTW?

Chapter five does not provide recommendations for corrective actions, but provides insight into current armored unit preparedness. Chapter five synthesizes the information of the previous four chapters in order to present OOTW requirements and show where US Army armored forces are today in relationship to where they need to be.

Key Terms

The nature of warfare, and for that matter the nature of OOTW, require a special understanding of today's doctrine and "lexicon". Thousands of abbreviations, acronyms, key terms, and equipment nomenclatures exist in manuals, texts, and publications. Listed below are some of the more critical terms required for an understanding of this thesis.

After Action Review (AAR). A review of training that allows soldiers, leaders and units to discover for themselves what happened during the training and why. Used to solicit ideas on how the training could be performed better.¹

Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR). A brigade-size armored unit consisting of three ground squadrons (tanks/Bradley's), and one aviation squadron (attack helicopters). The second variant of the ACR is the light ACR. This unit, although having similar structure, (three ground squadrons and one air) substitutes HMMWVs for tanks and Bradley's. Basic missions include reconnaissance, security, and economy of force.²

Battle Focus. A training concept used to derive peacetime training requirements from wartime missions.³ Since units cannot achieve and sustain proficiency on all possible tasks, the "battle focus" concept helps narrow the focus to a reasonable, attainable amount of training tasks.

Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV). The BFV (M-2) is the infantry version of the Bradley. Designed to provide transportation and armored protection for an infantry squad and a crew of three. Armament

includes: 25 millimeter chain gun, TOW missiles, and a coaxially mounted machine gun.

Cavalry Fighting Vehicle (CFV). The CFV (M-3) is the armored cavalry squadron's version of the M-2 BFV. It has the same chassis and armament as the M-2; however, it lacks the side firing ports of the M-2 and only carries two scouts and a three-man crew.

Combined Maneuver Training Center (CMTC). Located at Hohenfels, Germany, CMTC is the primary training center for all mechanized forces stationed in Germany. US armored and mechanized infantry battalions normally train at the CMTC once every twelve-to-eighteen months.

Contingency Plan (CONPLAN). Existing war plans designed for multiple theaters and potential operations. If necessary to execute, the plans contain sufficient detail, but are normally modified and tailored to specifically identified theater requirements.

Continental United States (CONUS). This acronym refers to military forces stationed within the continental United States.

FORCE XXI. Concept for the modernization and development of the US Army of the early twenty-first century. Force XXI is an information based era integrating the latest state-of-the-art technology into doctrine, training, and equipment. It describes how the Army will function in the future as the primary land force in both operations of war and OOTW.⁴ Some of the specific tank technology updates include: Inter-Vehicular Information System (IVIS), Positive Navigation systems (POSNAV), Commanders Independent Thermal Viewer (CITV), and future laser detection systems that provide Identification of Friend or Foe (IFF).

High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). The US Army's modern four-wheel-drive transport vehicle. Configurations range from four seat hard top versions, troop transport, cargo transport, to armed armored versions found in combat units.

Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). JRTC is located at Fort Polk, Louisiana. It exists as the primary training center for light infantry and cavalry units located within the United States.

M551 Sheridan. A light air-droppable tank. Armament includes the main gun (152mm) which is capable of firing both conventional ammunition, and the Shillelagh missile, and both a coaxially and turret mounted machine gun.

M1 Abrams. US inventory main battle tank. Armament includes a 105mm main gun, coaxially mounted, loader and tank commander machine guns.

M1A1 Abrams. Currently the primary main battle tank of US inventory. Same armament as above except the main gun is 120mm.

Mission Essential Task List (METL). A non prioritized list of tasks derived from the unit's war time mission requirements. The METL allows commanders from company to corps level to narrow training requirements to an achievable number. The METL should not be restricted by resource availability.⁵

Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT). All military actions planned and conducted in areas where man-made construction is the dominant feature. It includes combat in cities which is the portion of MOUT involving fighting from house-to-house and street-by-street.

National Training Center (NTC). Located at Fort Irwin California, the NTC is the major training center for heavy armored and mechanized infantry forces located within the United States. The NTC trains mechanized forces in a realistic, demanding desert environment. Maneuver units rotate to the NTC every twelve-to-eighteen months.

Outside the Continental United States (OCONUS). This acronym refers to military forces stationed outside the continental US.

Operations Other Than War (OOTW). OOTW refers to any military operation to protect and further the interests of the United States at home or abroad in a variety of ways other than war.⁶

Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA). The product of broad social, political, and technological change that affect the military and cause substantial reform to the existing methods of conducting warfare.⁷

Rules of Engagement (ROE). Directives issued by military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces.

Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). Written operating procedures designed to standardize all combat actions for a particular unit.

Applicable OOTW Activities

Peacekeeping Operations. Peacekeeping operations are military actions which support diplomatic efforts to maintain peace in areas of potential conflict. Designed to stabilize conflict between two belligerent nations requiring both of their consents.⁸

Peace Enforcement. Peace enforcement is a military intervention operation in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace. Peace enforcement implies the use of military force to coerce hostile factions to cease violent actions.⁹

Show of Force. A show of force is a military action which deploys a unit to a region to defuse a situation through its presence. These operations can take the form of training exercises, rehearsals, forward deployment, or buildup of military forces.¹⁰

Support to Domestic Civil Authorities. Military actions undertaken when appropriate governmental authority directs the armed forces to assist in domestic emergencies within CONUS.¹¹

Support for Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies. Support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies are military actions to assist either insurgent movements or host nation governments opposing an insurgency. In both instances, the military instrument of power supports political, economic, and informational objectives.¹²

Summary

The United States Army is experiencing dramatic change in its structure, size, and mission requirements. Doctrine has been developed and modified to better reflect the more complex, diverse, and often undefined roles and missions now referred to as OOTW. Since the end of the Cold War many branches of the service, particularly armor, are experiencing dramatic change as they prepare for a future with varying and increasing requirements.

Analysis of RMA, coupled with current security trends, indicates that the future military will have increased responsibilities and missions which fall under the OOTW umbrella. The question, "Are today's armored battalions trained for the challenges of OOTW?" stands as the central question of this thesis. The insight necessary to answer the question will come from three primary sources--analysis of historical roles of armor, training methodology, and doctrine.

Armored units historically adapt well to change. Now in addition to major regional contingency preparedness, armored units must add OOTW to their range of possible missions. Since American lives continue to be put on the line for war and OOTW, it is essential that armored leaders remain prepared for whatever challenges the future may hold. Chapter two begins this study with an analysis of historical examples of armors participation in previous OOTW.

Endnotes

¹U.S. Army, FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training (Washington: Department of the Army, 1990), G-2.

²U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1993), 2-23.

³Ibid., 1-10.

⁴U.S. Army, TRADOC Pam 525-5, Force XXI Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1994), i.

⁵Ibid., 2-1.

⁶FM 100-5., 13-0.

⁷Michael Mazarr, The Revolution of Military Affairs (Carlisle: US Army War College, 1994), 2.

⁸FM 100-5., 13-7.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid., 13-5.

¹²Ibid., 13-7.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

This chapter examines the evolution of weapons that led directly to the conception, design, and integration of the tank into warfare. Additionally, it examines the current Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) to determine the effects of RMA on the development of armored war fighting. Lastly it examines the use of armor in OOTW through several case studies.

The Evolution of Armor

For the purpose of this thesis, the term evolution refers to the pattern of development of weapons and tactics. RMA is the result of the combination of social, technological, and political change revising the role of the military and virtually changing how wars are fought.¹ Therefore, as is the case with the tank, the study will show how the introduction of such evolving weaponry has revolutionized the way in which wars are fought, but does not constitute an entire RMA.

The technological age leading to the tank's introduction had produced many marked changes. The railroad revolutionized strategic geography, making armies more mobile while creating a whole new science of logistics.² Communications became rapid, allowing units to quickly mass, form, receive orders, and fight; and the machine gun brought a new level of lethality to the battlefield.

In order to gain an appreciation of armored warfare, it is important to set the stage for its first appearance in battle. The tank, although a revolutionary weapon, was not introduced to battle in a slow deliberate pace. What made the tank so revolutionary was that it relied little upon new scientific ideas and technology, and more upon the proper assembling of technical devices already long in use. Initial tanks were simply armored machinegun carriers powered by the internal combustion engine. Within a matter of years, the tank was conceived, developed, refined, and inserted into battle changing the way wars were fought.

The interlocking fields of machinegun fire, associated with WWI, created a battlefield stalemate. There were only two possibilities: to go over the fields of fire in an aircraft or through them in an armored vehicle. The tank, equipped by the products of this technological revolution, was introduced both to make full use of the new technology, but more importantly to protect against it. These progressively longer-ranged weapons with improved accuracy required matched improvements in organization and tactics. Marked improvements in technology, such as the 1916 tank, could not be simply introduced on the battlefield without significantly adjusting tactics, training, and complete incorporation into the larger formation. The lethality of new weapons required unit dispersal for improved protection and survivability. Still, professional soldiers, with rigid ingrained training and discipline, saw dispersion as "a loss of control of both weapons and warfare."³

This technological era of the industrial revolution, which had markedly improved weapons of war, remained fixed on outdated doctrine and tactics. Despite marked improvements in explosives, machine guns, communications, and transport, tactics reflected past wars and old technology. The result was the stalemate and trench warfare of the western front. However, the tank brought mobility back into ground warfare. In August 1918, British armored units spearheaded an assault which achieved an eight-mile breakthrough at Amiens, killing or capturing 28,000 Germans, and destroying 400 guns. General Erich Ludendorff declared it "the blackest day of the German Army in the history of war."⁴ The insertion of mobile, protected firepower, overcame the stalemate conditions associated with WWI allowing armor to come of age and establish itself as a key component of maneuver warfare.

During the next great war--WWII, the tactical methods for the tank's employment would finally catch up with the latest increases in technology. Tactical concepts of mass, maneuver, and combined arms operations were refined and inserted into developing maneuver doctrine. Much of this doctrine remains valid today; however, as military forces undertake more nontraditional roles in nontraditional settings, some of this doctrine loses its validity. When tanks are pitted against rebel forces or employed in other non standard combat, typical missions and training often do not apply. Recent history shows many examples of armored forces performing other than war-fighting missions. These vary from counterinsurgency operations to simple presence in order to keep the peace. The Soviets in Afghanistan, the Israelis in Lebanon, and the

Chinese in Tiananmen Square all used tanks, but the role of the tank in each case was dramatically different.

New technology continues to improve or discard weapons systems and, consequently, modifies military application of force. The tank, a product of turn-of-the-century technology, was developed to solve a particular tactical dilemma. The modern tank incorporates newly developed technology to retain its role as the combat arm of decision. Once introduced into combat, the tank quickly asserted itself as a vital piece of the combined arms team. Now against the backdrop of the information age, high technology, and evolving threats, the tank's relative value on the battlefield is challenged. But as army roles and missions change, the presence of armor continues to grow both on the battlefield and within the steadily increasing arena of OOTW. Potentially complex training challenges for the army of the twenty-first century may very well be solved by the current "Battle Focused" training concepts.

It is instructive to examine various case studies involving the use of armor. These studies examine both US and foreign employment of armor to resolve previous OOTW roles and missions. Chapter three analyzes these OOTW roles to determine whether the training methodology, currently conducted by armored battalions, is sufficient to prepare them for OOTW.

Case Study 1 - Vietnam

As in Korea, the US Army entered the Vietnam War using WWII doctrine and experiences as the basis for training. Tactics and

techniques, required for success in Southeast Asia, were significantly different from those learned during combat operations in WWII. Yet, during the Vietnam conflict, the armor officers training at the "Home of Armor," Fort Knox Kentucky, continued to train to fight on the plains of Europe, with little attention paid toward Vietnam.

When US forces first entered the Republic of Vietnam, their broad mission was to prevent the spread of Communism. But like other OOTW activities, an unspecified end state and unclear missions led to increased force deployments without any criteria for victory or withdrawal. In terms of today's OOTW activities, the Vietnam conflict is best described as "Support for Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies".

The first major ground forces that the US committed in Vietnam were primarily infantry and cavalry (air mobile) forces. Their deployment superimposed a modern army into a region with an underdeveloped infrastructure. The US forces had to adapt their tactics and force structure to new and varying requirements.⁵

The US initially deployed few armored units to Vietnam since the military leadership believed that armored units could "play no significant part due to the terrain, the enemy, and the nature of warfare."⁶ This belief was based on the generally unsuccessful French experience with armored forces in Vietnam.⁷ Experience gained by the US armored divisions in North Africa and Europe during WWII, caused many to conclude that "only in these theaters was warfare with armor possible."⁸ American experience in the Pacific and Korea confirmed the impression that although the tank operated well in support of the infantry, it had limited use in jungle and mountain terrain.⁹

Further the US Army exhibited a "singular lack of doctrine for mounted combat in areas other than Europe and the deserts of Africa."¹⁰ Consequently the army leadership was reluctant to commit armor elsewhere. In July 1965, a major debate arose concerning the use of armor in Vietnam. Discussing the deployment of the 1st Infantry Division, the Army Staff decided that, except for the division's cavalry squadron, all the division armored and mechanized units would leave their tanks in the states and fight as light infantry. While discussing the subject with the Army Chief of Staff General Johnson, General Westmoreland declared that "except for a few coastal areas, Vietnam is no place for either tank or mechanized infantry units."¹¹ Even after the divisional cavalry squadron arrived in country, it was employed differently than they had trained. Cavalry troops were split up among the three infantry brigades and sent to three separate locations. Their M48A3 tanks were consolidated and parked at the Division Headquarters per General Westmoreland's direction.¹² The prevailing belief of service commanders was that tanks had no role nor place within the Southeast Asian theater. However, the nature of the war and the enemy was changing from predominantly guerrilla units to increasingly well-trained and equipped North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regiments and divisions.¹³ These regular forces often used conventional tactics and employed modern automatic weapons, artillery, and a large number of mines.¹⁴ Tanks, with their inherent protection against such weapons, caused commanders to finally realize their role in Vietnam combat.

When tanks were finally used in battle in Vietnam, they quickly proved themselves as an integral part of the combined arms team. Tank

units proved an effective reaction force since fighting was likely to occur from any direction and at any time. The tanks invulnerability to small arms and mines, combined with the tanks mobility and firepower, proved their value in South Vietnam. All doubts about armor's effectiveness in Vietnam were dispelled by the large multi unit operations in January 1965, such as "Cedar Falls" and "Junction City." These large-scale operations destroyed enemy fortifications, captured many weapons caches, and resulted in high enemy casualty rates. US casualties during these operations were comparatively low. Over the next few years the tank performed many new missions in Vietnam. In addition to traditional roles, such as close support, indirect fire, and route security, armored units often operating as individual tanks or sections conducted missions such as convoy escort, bunker destruction, ambush support, base security, and jungle busting.¹⁵ As a result of the successful mechanized and armored operations in Vietnam, the US increased the deployment of armored vehicles to Vietnam. Tanks and mechanized infantry vehicles contributed substantially to the Army's total combat power in Vietnam.¹⁶

From early March 1965 until the cease fire in January 1973, US armored forces participated in virtually every type of mission in Vietnam. These operations ranged from large-scale offensive actions to guarding local harvests. After eight years of fighting over terrain that severely hampered the movement of armored forces, in weather that supposedly prohibited armored operations, and an elusive enemy, armored forces emerged as a powerful, flexible, and essential battle force.¹⁷

Case Study 2 - Soviet Army in Afghanistan

In the spring of 1978, Afghanistan President Daoud tried to rid the country of the Communist Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Underestimating the degree of Communist infiltration of his military, government administration, and his own cabinet, Daoud had three of the PDPA's leaders arrested. On 26 April 1978, a PDPA-controlled armored brigade stormed the presidential palace killing everyone inside.¹⁸ The PDPA's recruitment of Soviet-trained officers had paid off. Three days after the coup, the military withdrew, and the communists proclaimed the Communist Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Under the leadership of President Taraki, the conditions in Afghanistan worsened causing rebellion to flare across the countryside. Between July 1978 and the autumn of 1979 the government lost control of 80 percent of the country. Hafizullah Amin, a ruthless opportunist and communist, became the Prime Minister in March 1979. His bodyguard assassinated President Taraki just days after Taraki returned from visiting General Secretary Brezhnev in Moscow. Amin became the new President, and the situation worsened as his government continued to infuriate the populace while slipping further out of Moscow's orbit. The Soviets invaded Afghanistan on 24 December 1979, killed Amin, and established a puppet government.¹⁹

The official explanation given by the Soviet leadership for invading Afghanistan was that they needed to "defend a revolutionary government endangered by a foreign supported insurrection."²⁰ The Soviets insisted that a military contingent stationed in Afghanistan would not get involved in a direct conflict, but merely provide a strong

presence until the "cause of the intervention had disappeared."²¹ They stood by this explanation until 1986.

Initial feeling amongst the Soviet leadership was that nothing more than a show of force was required to restore stability in Afghanistan. But good planning and superior equipment were soon nullified by the combination of expanding missions, difficult terrain, and a stubborn, increasingly effective enemy.²² Suddenly the Soviets found themselves playing a counterinsurgency role for which they were completely unprepared.

The primary Soviet force deployed into Afghanistan was neither special operations forces, nor trained counterinsurgency forces. The Soviets 40th Army contained motorized rifle, airborne, and air assault forces. Initially, the motorized rifle divisions had their full complement of tanks and air defense artillery. Until 1982, the Soviets tried to wage large-scale operations with armored forces. Approximately twice a year the 40th Army conducted large, offensive, combined-arms operations which were suitable for the European theater, but were ineffective in the mountainous terrain in Afghanistan and often resulted in heavy Soviet losses.²³ The Soviet military fixation on a war against NATO left them ill-prepared for a situation which "posed problems far removed from those found on the plains of Europe."²⁴

In one of the first major offenses, Soviet tanks attacked a rebel-controlled area with supporting artillery, fixed wing aircraft, helicopter gunships, and rockets. They discovered that the rebels would wait out the assault and infiltrate assembly areas to attack the Soviets at night. The Mujahedin commanders were not impressed by overwhelming

combat power and considered the Soviet leaders to be "inflexible, and mechanical in their tactical responses, committed to cook book warfare."²⁵ Trained for conventional war, Soviet motorized rifle commanders lacked the doctrine, the skill, and the necessary tactics for counterinsurgency warfare in mountainous terrain.²⁶

Initially, motorized rifle and tank units performed both security and reaction tasks including: combat reconnaissance patrols, armored support to an ambush, convoy escort, search and destroy, and even reconnaissance by fire missions. Toward the latter part of the Soviet occupation, armored unit missions became more defensive in nature. What Soviet Commanders discovered was that heavy armored tanks not only destroyed the few existing roads, but when attacked from the mountain heights were often ineffective due to the limitations caused by gun tube elevation. Tanks were now positioned to secure main supply routes, guard garrisons, and defend mountain outposts.²⁷

By 1983 the Soviets clearly realized the serious deficiency caused by employing such ill-suited forces. Gradually, combat with the Mujahedin became the task of airborne, air assault, special forces, and so-called separate motorized rifle brigades--brigades specifically structured and trained for counterinsurgency. The bulk of the tanks were pulled out due to their unsuitability to the Afghanistan conflict. In over nine years of conflict, they had "failed to strike any decisive blows, even locally, against the Mujahedin."²⁸ And although motorized rifle forces used tanks and mechanized infantry in new innovative ways, the overriding lesson of the war was the "failure of the Soviets to mount effective counterinsurgency warfare."²⁹ It was clear that

"motorized rifle forces were not able to adapt to the tactical situation in which it found itself."³⁰

In the latter years of Soviet military occupation in Afghanistan, counterinsurgency forces, to include special operations, airborne, and air assault, assumed most of the duties previously conducted by motorized rifle units. But as the motorized forces re-deployed to pre war locations, many new lessons learned and armored applications went with them.

Case Study 3 - Panama, Operation Just Cause

The months leading up to Operation Just Cause were characterized as stressful, anxious and dangerous. Panama was viewed as unstable, and its leader Manuel Noriega was suspected of involvement in illegal drug trafficking. The Panama Canal was to pass to Panamanian control at the end of the century, and with 12,000 American military personnel and families living in the country, US-Panamanian relations were strained.³¹

That was the situation until President Manuel Noriega nullified the presidential elections, after his hand-picked candidate lost to Guillermo Endara. Ensuing beatings, rioting, and protests increased the strain to US-Panamanian relations. On 16 December 1989, members of the Panama Defense Force (PDF) killed a US lieutenant and assaulted and abused another officer and his wife.³² US growing concern over protection of US interests, protection of US citizens, and free trade through the Canal led to the implementation of the existing CONPLAN "Blue Spoon," later refined and executed as Operation Just Cause. These events initiated unit activations and an increased readiness posture of

both XVIII Airborne Corps units in the United States and US forces operating in Panama.

One of these units, 3-73 Armor, was the 82nd Airborne Division's separate tank battalion. When tanks from 3-73 Armor Battalion (Airborne) arrived in Panama, their first mission was to conduct a "Show of Force." As part of a Joint Task Force, tanks and Marine Corps LAV's moved across the Panama Canal to predetermined assembly areas.³³

Armored history was made with the beginning of combat operations. On 20 December 1989, four M551 Sheridan tanks parachuted into combat. Linking up with the tanks pre positioned in country, multiple operations began. Initial plans called for six Sheridans, organized in pairs, attached to each of the three infantry battalions. Two additional Sheridans would link up with an engineer squad and establish blocking positions along highway one which was the main route running from Tocumen-Torrijos Airport.³⁴ The primary missions, given to the tanks operating in theater, were support dismounted maneuver, protect convoys, reduce buildings and bunkers, establish road-blocks, and conduct mounted patrolling.³⁵ Since the tank's heavy armor protection and firepower were unmatched by the PDF, the sectors in which the tank operated tended to be quieter and easier to control for the infantry.³⁶ During MOUT operations, the tank provided security, firepower, and support to dismounted patrols and conducted these tasks with relative security, due to its inherent armored protection.³⁷

Post-hostility concerns changed to controlling rioting, looting, and establishing a secure operating environment. The role of the tank again focused on a show of force. Locations dominated by mobs and

sniper fire were quickly subdued by the appearance of the Sheridan. Moving back and forth down the city streets at night, the tanks supported infantry patrols using a searchlight to control crowds and illuminate possible enemy positions.³⁸

By 9 January 1990, the remainder of 3-73 Armor returned from Panama with all missions accomplished and only one crewman slightly injured. This performance of the tank in OOTW, operating as part of the combined arms team, was extremely successful.

Case Study 4 - China Tiananmen Square

The employment of tanks at Tiananmen Square on 3 June 1989 is best described as a show of force. The intent of a show of force is to deploy forces to defuse a situation that is detrimental to a country's interests or national objectives.³⁹ The resultant slaughter at Tiananmen square far exceeded the government's intentions.

In 1986, after ten years of economic growth in China, many university students focused their energies to attaining political freedom. In 1986, then Communist Party Secretary Hu Yaobang sided with the student protests and was subsequently fired from his position. Three years later on 15 April 1989 Hu Yaobang died. Campus memorial services all over the country quickly turned into government critique sessions.⁴⁰ At Beijing University, the protest march, which had grown too big for the campus, moved into Tiananmen Square. Word spread quickly and more than 100,000 students from other schools joined in. These students saw themselves as "Patriots trying to reform the Party."⁴¹ The Chinese unrest among students was characterized by

marchers carrying banners declaring "give me liberty, or give me death!"⁴² For weeks, thousands of students took part in hunger strikes "refusing food to try and force the government to listen to them."⁴³ The sight of students risking their lives for the beliefs, won the hearts of a large segment of the nation causing the number of demonstrators in Tiananmen to grow in excess of one million.⁴⁴

Probably the last straw for the government was the formation of independent worker unions in cities across the country. This directly challenged the Communist Party's main claim to legitimacy that it represents the workers. The government called the movement a "planned conspiracy, a rebellion aimed at destroying communism"⁴⁵ and on 3 June sent the Peoples Liberation Army into Tiananmen Square. Over 300,000 troops, including more than twenty T-55 Soviet-built tanks, crushed barricades and drove through crowds of people that stood in their way.⁴⁶ Men, women, and children were machine gunned down. At the days end, over 1,000 people lay dead in the square--the nation was "scared back into silence."⁴⁷

Although the use of force at Tiananmen was overwhelming and brutal, the destructive role of the tank subsequent to the show of force stands clear. The infantry forces that marched in the square that day were subject to beating, stoning, and even small arms fire. The tanks and their crews caused both the majority of destruction and casualties and demonstrated their role as a weapon of shock.

Case Study 5 - Haiti
Operation Uphold Democracy/Restore Democracy

In September 1994, 3-73 Armor Battalion (Airborne) participated in the preparation for the planned invasion of Haiti, Operation Restore Democracy. When invasion plans were canceled, 3-73 Armor received a change of mission. Their new mission was to deploy selected portions of the battalion to Haiti to assist the peaceful return of President Aristide, under Operation Uphold Democracy.⁴⁸ On 25 September, 3-73 Armor deployed two tank companies and their respective support and service support elements. Twenty-nine M551 Sheridans and over fifty wheeled vehicles off-loaded at Bowmen Airfield and prepared to support the 10th Mountain Division.⁴⁹

While attached to the 10th Mountain Division, Task Force 3-73 Armor performed a variety of tactical missions to deter violence and protect US and Haitian property and personnel. Initially, as part of the main effort, 3-73 conducted screening operations to deter crowd movement and violence and to protect US and designated Haitian facilities and residences.⁵⁰ Next, serving as the reserve for 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, the battalion conducted search operations for weapon's caches and known terrorist and opposition leaders throughout Port-au-Prince. Later the battalion provided security for cordon and search operations, established road blocks, and conducted mounted patrolling.⁵¹

With the anticipated arrival of President Aristide, Task Force 3-73 again changed missions. Focused more on security and protection, the unit now began aggressive mounted and dismounted patrolling, set roadblocks at key intersections, and received a second screening mission

east of the Haitian National Palace to prevent violence that could hinder the Presidents return.⁵²

All the missions assigned to TF 3-73 were again successfully executed. The very nature of the mission changed from forced to peaceful entry. The tasks that the battalion conducted ranged from standard METL tasks to OOTW specific operations. The Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Lavine stated that: "With respect to OOTW-specific training, the TF found that its normal (METL focused) training, adequately prepared the TF and companies for the tactical missions performed in Haiti."⁵³

Endnotes

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⁴³Ibid.

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⁴⁶Ibid., 2.

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CHAPTER 3

TRAINING ANALYSIS

This chapter analyzes the way armored forces train for OOTW. It examines units' missions, and the Mission Essential Task List (METL) development process and how OOTW is integrated. Then it analyzes training trends to determine if and how they apply to OOTW, and what the training similarities and differences are.

Training binds the Army into a force capable of decisive victory. Only by maintaining such a force can the expectations Americans have for the Army be met. Tough, realistic, battle-focused training prepares the Army for a wide variety of missions.¹

Today's armored forces are faced with a variety of training challenges brought on as a result of the new world order. In times of force reductions and budget restraints, armored forces are attempting both to remain at an acceptable level of training for war and to ensure their preparedness for the ever increasing requirements of OOTW. The added dimension of OOTW and the potential for conducting missions that are not directly related to war-fighting creates a dichotomy between training for war and being able to execute non war-fighting missions.

But what tough, realistic, battle focused training should a unit conduct? During the Cold War the mission, the enemy situation, and their capabilities were clearly defined allowing units to establish a specific contingency-tailored METL. This METL provided the unit with an

unconstrained statement of tasks required to accomplish wartime missions that could be changed or adjusted as wartime missions changed.² Because of the relative "mission stability" provided by the former Soviet threat, once these METLs were designed and tailored to specific requirements, they only needed occasional revision. OOTW and associated requirements create new challenges for the army and how it trains. To fully understand the spectrum of war and OOTW, FM 100-5, Operations, describes three states of environment as war, conflict, and peacetime.³ These environments have varying effects on army forces from the type of unit needed to the degree of potential hostilities. They also could all exist at once within a particular theater of operation. Below is a more detailed explanation of each.

War. The goal of war is to fight and win. It is characterized by combat and examples include attack and defend.⁴

Conflict. The goal of conflicts is to deter war and resolve conflict. It is characterized potentially by both combat and non combat missions. Examples here include peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and NEO.⁵ This is the predominant state of environment for the application of armored forces in OOTW.

Peacetime. The goal in peacetime is to maintain and promote peace. Characterized by non-combat operations, examples include: disaster relief, nation assistance, and civil disturbance.⁶ Units that support such operations are generally combat support and combat service support. In some instances when extensive manpower is required, combat units are integrated, but usually without their equipment.

Having established the potential states of environment, and realizing that armored forces could potentially serve in one or all three simultaneously, it is important to establish a training philosophy that can meet all these requirements. The Mission Essential Task List (METL) is the process currently used by the US Army to provide training focus. The following information demonstrates the operations of this process.

METL Development Process

The first step in METL development is analysis of the unit's missions and other external directives which impact on training requirements. The commander must analyze his specific wartime mission to determine the required tasks. Next any external directives that may impact on the mission are considered. Examples of these external directives are mobilization plans or contingency operations. After analysis of the mission and external directives, the commander formulates his initial METL. This initial list, because it is an unconstrained list, is then further refined into an acceptable, trainable, amount of tasks that complement the higher unit's METL.⁷




Fig. 1. METL development process.
 (Source: FM 25-101 Battle Focused Training, p. 2-2)

Having examined the METL development process (fig.1), this study will now examine specific armor battalion missions and METL. This analysis examines a cross sampling of armored units in the US and Germany, to determine the emphasis placed on OOTW. This sampling includes units with specific overseas contingency missions and US-based Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF), prepared to deploy within hours of notification to any theater in the world for any purposes. These units are depicted in figure 2, and their respective missions and METL depicted in figures 3-8.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>RDF</u>	<u>CONUS/OCONUS</u>
1-64/24ID	Ft. Stewart	Y	CONUS
2-77/4ID	Ft. Carson	N	CONUS
3-37/1ID	Ft. Riley	N	CONUS
1-8/1CV	Ft. Hood	Y	CONUS
3-73/82ID	Ft. Bragg	Y	CONUS
4-67/1AD	Germany	N	OCONUS

Fig. 2. Units and locations.




Fig. 3. Mission Statement and METL, 1-64 Armor.




Fig. 4. Mission Statement and METL, 2-77 Armor.




Fig. 5. Mission Statement and METL, 3-37 Armor.




Fig. 6. Mission Statement and METL, 1-8 Cav.




Fig. 7. Mission Statement and METL, 3-73 Armor.




Fig. 8. Mission Statement and METL, 4-67 Armor.

<u>TASK</u>	<u>1-64</u>	<u>2-77</u>	<u>3-37</u>	<u>1-8</u>	<u>3-73</u>	<u>4-67</u>
Transition to war/OOTW		X				
Transition to war	X			X		
Conduct Peacekeeping						X
Deploy (air/land/sea)			X	X	X	X
Occupy Assembly Area	X	X				
Move tactically (TRM)	X	X				X
Passage of lines	X	X				
Attack/Catk by fire	X	X		X	X	X
Fight a meeting engagement		X	X		X	X
Assault		X	X		X	
Breach defended obstacle	X		X			X
Defend	X	X	X	X	X	X
Perform link up	X					
Screen					X	
Command and Control	X		X		X	
Perform CSS	X	X	X	X	X	X
Protect the force				X		

Fig. 9. Summary of Armor Unit METLs.

Two major points derive from the data found in Figure 9. First, and with only a few variations, the METLs are somewhat generic. Due to the lack of specific contingency operations and former General Defensive Plans (GDP), the essential missions are similar. Second, with only two exceptions (2-77 and 4-67), the METLs do not include OOTW type tasks, rather they consist of armor war-fighting tasks. The important question is then, whether or not today's armored battalions should include OOTW in their missions and METL. General Franks, Commander of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) from 1992-1994, said this about training for war versus OOTW, "OOTW does not necessarily exclude combat. How to think about planning and executing those operations builds on the skill, toughness, and teamwork gained from the primary focus on war-fighting."⁸ This sends the message that training with a go-to-war focus has direct application preparing a unit for OOTW.

A war-fighting approach to training ensures that the army continues to stand ready for war--its primary mission--and not operations other than war. It also indicates training for war is not mutually exclusive from training for OOTW. Most of the tasks associated with training for war, are completely interchangeable with conducting operations other than war. To highlight this point, the study examines unit METLs, analyzes the associated training tasks, and conducts a comparable analysis for the OOTW tasks to identify which are like, unlike, or unique.

The following chart depicts the consolidated battalion METL, and lists both the task number and reference. (Task numbers refer to specific training tasks which guide the commander in organizing his unit's training.)

ARMOR BATTALION CONSOLIDATED METL

<u>Task</u>	<u>Task #</u>	<u>Reference</u>
Transition to war/OOTW	NA	Unit SOP
Transition to war	NA	Unit SOP
Deploy (air/land/sea)	NA	Unit SOP
Conduct Peacekeeping	NA	FM 100-23
Occupy Assembly Area	7-1-3001	FM 71-2 MTP
Move tactically(TRM)	7-1-3004	FM 71-2 MTP
Passage of lines	7-1-3003	FM 71-2 MTP
Attack/Catk by fire	7-1-3008	FM 71-2 MTP
Fight a mtng engagement	7-1-3006	FM 71-2 MTP
Assault	7-1-3007	FM 71-2 MTP
Breach defended obstacle	7-1-3027	FM 71-2 MTP
Defend	7-1-3009	FM 71-2 MTP
Perform link up	7-1-3015	FM 71-2 MTP
Screen	7-1-3026	FM 71-2 MTP
Command and Control	7-1-3901	FM 71-2 MTP
Perform CSS	7-1-3912	FM 71-2 MTP

Fig. 10. METL to training manual reference.

Clearly, at the battalion level, training tasks, conditions, and standards come directly from the FM 71-2 MTP, The Tank and Mechanized Battalion Task Force Mission Training Plan. This training manual lists all possible tasks, establishes the operation-to-collective task matrix, and highlights both leader and critical tasks.⁹ Using this standardized approach to training allows units to rate their proficiency as either "T" for trained, "P" needs practice, or "U" for untrained. Within the training cycle, training strengths are maintained through sustainment training, and identified training weaknesses receive the necessary emphasis in order to improve the unit and their rating.

The next step of this training analysis is to examine the consolidated list of OOTW tasks. Because these tasks are not found within the MTP, they must be cross referenced or related to standard METL tasks in order to determine their training task's conditions and standards. These training tasks derive from the historical analysis chapter which examined case studies to include: US armor in Vietnam, Panama, and Haiti; the Soviets in Afghanistan; and the Chinese in Tiananmen Square. Analysis of the case studies confirms that in an OOTW environment, units conduct both traditional METL and OOTW tasks. Because the previous list examined the METL tasks and associated training standards, this list will focus only on those OOTW-associated tasks not found in the mission training plan.

SUMMARY OF ARMOR TASKS EXECUTED IN OOTW

<u>TASK</u>	<u>VN</u>	<u>PAN</u>	<u>HAITI</u>	<u>AFGH</u>	<u>CHINA</u>
<u>Category I</u>					
Convoy escort	X	X	X	X	
Route security	X	X	X	X	
Base defense	X	X	X	X	
Area security	X	X	X	X	
Infantry support	X	X	X	X	X
Ambush support	X			X	
<u>Category II</u>					
Jungle busting	X				
Roadblock destr		X			
Harvest guarding	X				
Bunker destr	X	X			
Bldg entry holes		X			
Recon by fire	X	X		X	
Road block	X	X			
<u>Category III</u>					
Traffic control	X	X			
MOUT		X	X		
Cordon & Search	X	X	X		

Fig. 11. Armor tasks executed in OOTW.

By examining the OOTW task list in figure 11, the tasks fall into one of three major categories. Category I are tasks that closely align with standard METL tasks having defined conditions and standards found in armor doctrine. In the second category are those tasks which are not unit mission tasks, but tasks executed in support of tactical missions at the individual crew and section level. The standards for these tasks are found in vehicle operator or gunnery manuals. The third category are those tasks conducted by armored units, but whose conditions and standards are found in other-than-armor doctrine. These tasks must extrapolate their standards from multiple sources in order to successfully accomplish them.

ARMOR OOTW TASKS

<u>TASK</u>	<u>TRAINING MANUAL CROSS REFERENCE</u>
<u>Category I</u>	
Convoy escort	MTP TASK --> TRM/Move tactically
Route security	TRM
Base defense	Assembly area operations
Area security	Area defense
Infantry support	Offense/Defense operations
Ambush support	Offense/Defense operations
<u>Category II</u>	
Jungle busting	Driving task
Roadblock destr	Driving task
Harvest guarding	Security task
Bunker destruction	Employ the Main Gun (FM 17-12)
Bldg entry holes	Employ the Main Gun (FM 17-12)
Recon by fire	Employ the Main Gun and Machine Guns (FM 17-12)
Road block	Combination of "Occupy a tank Position" and "Security operations"
<u>Category III</u>	
Traffic control	Military Police training task
MOUT	MOUT OPS (FM 17-30/FM 31-50/FM 90-10)
Cordon & search	Infantry Task (Also tied to MOUT)

Fig. 12. OOTW tasks to training manual reference.

The next step in the analysis is to identify the training requirements particular to a unit's leadership. First the study examines current analytical staff tools to determine their applicability to OOTW, and then examines the OOTW particular tasks to determine their relationship, if any, to training for war.

Leader and Staff Training

Tactical training that a commander and staff conduct for operations of war also apply to OOTW. Standard analytical staff tools solve the complex requirements that arise from any operation's planning.

An intelligence officer in an OOTW environment describes enemy activity in terms of "gang activity" or "reports of gunfire" instead of enemy battalions or chemical strikes. The doctrinal four step Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process provides an analytical tool that is adaptable to both war and OOTW. The operation's officer in war as well as OOTW, uses the tactical decision-making process to analyze the mission, develop a course of action, and make recommendations to the commander. He completes the steps of the decision-making process regardless of the theater, culture, threat, or ROE. Leaders and staff operating in an OOTW environment must be aware of theater operating constraints and limitations, but remain versatile by arming themselves in training with proven comprehensive staff tools. This will ensure that the commander, the staff, and all unit leaders operate effectively in any environment.

The final portion of this training analysis is to identify those tasks not normally trained as a result of the "Battle Focused" METL approach to training. These primarily staff and leader tasks range from "Media Interrelations" to "Supervising a Cease fire." Again, many of these tasks also apply to both war and OOTW. For example, the skills associated with "Media Interrelation" pose similar challenges for commanders and staff whether operating in war or OOTW. The following chart lists these non-METL tasks and also indicates whether they apply to war OOTW or both.

NON-METL TRAINING TASKS

<u>Tasks apply to: --></u>	<u>War</u>	<u>OOTW</u>
Regional Orientation/Culture of belligerents	X	X
Negotiating skills		X
Unexploded ordnance training	X	X
Checkpoint operations	X	X
Investigating/reporting	X	X
Media interrelations	X	X
Establish a buffer zone		X
Supervise a truce or cease fire	X	X
Contribute to the maintenance of law and order	X	X
Demilitarize cities or geographical areas	X	X
Monitor boundaries	X	X
DART (Downed ACFT Recovery Tng)	X	X

Fig. 13. Non-METL training tasks.

Clearly, these leader tasks have critical bearings to both operations of war and OOTW. It is important to note that rarely will a battalion task force find itself in a position where it is the primary organization supervising a truce. Many agencies exist to conduct negotiations from division level and higher staffs to political and diplomatic agencies. The majority of these tasks, like understanding regional customs or the culture of belligerents, require constant consideration for all operations whether or not the operations involve conflict.

Chapter three indicates a strong correlation between training for war and training for OOTW. Although unit missions and METL do not specifically address OOTW, the process for preparing for war directly supports a unit preparing for OOTW. Also, the majority of the tasks specifically associated with OOTW were found to be tasks that units should consider whether in a state of peace, conflict, or war. US Army doctrine for OOTW is examined in the next Chapter.

Endnotes

¹U.S. Army, Army Focus 93 (Washington: Department of the Army, 1993), 1-3.

²U.S. Army, FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training (Washington: Department of the Army, 1990), 2-2.

³U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1993), Fig. 2-1.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

⁷U.S. Army, FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training (Washington: Department of the Army, 1990), 2-2.

⁸Frederick M. Franks, "Full Dimensional Operations, A Doctrine for an era of change," Military Review, (December 1993), 10.

⁹U.S. Army, FM 71-2 MTP, the Tank and Mechanized Battalion Task Force Mission Training Plan. (Washington: Department of the Army, 1988), 2-3.

CHAPTER 4

DOCTRINE ANALYSIS

Doctrine is the statement of how the US Army, normally as part of a joint team or coalition, intends to conduct war and OOTW. It is the expression of the fundamental approach to war fighting or methods of influencing events other than war. Doctrine provides the information for deterring actions detrimental to national interests. It must be defined enough to guide actions, yet adaptable enough to address varied and changing situations.¹

The focus of this chapter is on the availability and suitability of doctrine written for the support of armored units conducting OOTW.

Background

Analysis of doctrinal information concerning the tactical employment of armored forces relates primarily to their employment in large scale warfare. Little is written for the tactical employment of armor in OOTW. There are two reasons for this. First, the primary mission of the armed forces is not OOTW, but to deter, and if necessary, fight and win conflicts threatening the national interest.² The second reason is that OOTW was only recently inserted into the US Army training lexicon. What was previously referred to as Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), in addition to all information concerning peacekeeping, counterinsurgency warfare, and subjects such as MOUT, are now all

included under the encompassing umbrella of OOTW. The OOTW designation and acronym was only introduced into the Army's capstone manual, FM 100-5, Operations in 1990.

Current versus Future War Fighting Fundamentals

US Army war-fighting doctrine reflects the nature of modern warfare. It applies the principles of war, the dynamics of combat power, the tenets of operations, and the combat functions to contemporary and future battlefields.³ Since OOTW creates new challenges for the Army, there is an attempt to develop corresponding doctrine. But as seen in the previous chapter on training, the majority of doctrine and training methods focused on war, support the training and preparation for OOTW. Also highlighted previously was that OOTW-particular tasks had the largest impact on the units' leadership and staff, and therefore training should focus on that population at professional school houses. Leader development programs should include tasks, such as negotiating skills, cultural considerations, and managing rules of engagement.⁴

Today, the growing concern in the combined arms community is the applicability of doctrine to meet the needs of the military across the spectrum of peace and war. The question then is whether there exists a requirement to create new fundamentals of war-fighting, or whether doctrine as currently written for war will suffice for OOTW. What appears as an attempt to "create a new wheel" may possibly best be solved with slight modifications or tailoring of accepted tactics, techniques, procedures, and fundamentals.

An example of doctrine tailoring was conducted by the 10th Mountain Division during Operation Restore Hope. As the lead Army Force (ARFOR) for the operation, the division felt that the current Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) did not entirely encompass their specific needs in Somalia. Specifically, since no air threat existed the Division eliminated air defense from the BOS and added external coordination, force protection, and information dissemination.⁵ External coordination was added due to the large number of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), civil military organizations, and town elders in the area. Force protection was added to the planning process to provide both an increased focus on ROE and soldier protection. Information dissemination was added because of the need to interact with journalists and interpreters.⁶

Rather than adding force protection to the BOS, another alternative could have been to work with the existing BOS combined with the principles of war and OOTW, of which security is already listed. External Coordination, also added to the BOS, is extensively covered within previous doctrinal manuals to include FM 100-20, Military Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict, and FM 7-98, Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict. Additionally, adding a BOS to deal with NGO's has little effect on the overall unit and involves only a few key staff members.

The foundations of Army operations, found in FM 100-5, Operations, provide a synchronized, time-tested, capstone doctrine for the direct engagement of an enemy in a large-scale war. Principles, tenets, and dynamics of combat characterize successful conventional

operations and also apply to OOTW. Therefore, OOTW specific "Operating Systems" need not be created. Operators and planners preparing for an OOTW mission must use several references to discover the techniques and procedures for OOTW missions.

The following pages analyze available material by breaking into four major categories--three Department of the Army approved doctrinal categories, and the other lessons learned and publications. The title of these four categories are: current war fighting doctrine, (to include armor doctrine), general OOTW doctrine, and future doctrine. The fourth category is composed of the publications found at the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). By breaking the information into these categories, it is easier to analyze the relevancy of doctrine and its applicability to armored forces preparing for OOTW.

War Fighting Doctrine

FM 100-5 Operations

FM 100-5, Operations, is the Army's keystone war fighting doctrine. OOTW and thirteen illustrative activities were integrated into this capstone manual in 1990. FM 100-5 describes the conduct of campaigns, major operations, battles, engagements, and OOTW.⁷ From strategic to tactical level, this manual reflects the adaptation of technology to new weapon systems and capabilities, organizations, missions, training, leader development, and soldier support.⁸

Chapter 13, OOTW, and its thirteen mission activities stand as the foundation for Army planning and its approach to OOTW. The chapter recognizes that the Army's primary focus is to fight and win the nations

wars and addresses the implications of its forces operating around the world in environments that may not involve conflict.⁹ The emphasis of the chapter is on the six principles of OOTW and descriptions of the thirteen OOTW activities, pointing out that the Army is not limited to those thirteen.

As the Army's keystone war fighting doctrine, all branches of the Army use it to establish the foundation on which they build their own branch-specific war fighting doctrine. This transference of doctrinal thought is well represented within the doctrine governing the employment of armor.

Armor War Fighting Doctrine

The primary sources of doctrine for the employment of armor are the 17 and 71 series Field Manuals (FMs). These manuals, combined with their respective Mission Training Plans (MTPs), provide the tactics, techniques, and procedures for armor in combat. Neither manual mentions OOTW, but OOTW is a relatively new acronym. These manuals deal with the LIC and MOUT aspects of OOTW. Additionally, as seen in chapter three, war fighting skills have direct applicability to OOTW. Clearly the emphasis of armor doctrine is on major regional conflicts, emphasizing heavy-to-medium and not low-intensity conflict. Starting in the 1960s, the evolution of doctrine with its emphasis on high-to-medium levels of combat led directly to the present day scarcity of low-intensity/OOTW type doctrine.

During the Vietnam conflict, the belief that armor had little or no role was fueled by the lack of doctrine for mounted combat in areas other than Europe and the deserts of Africa.¹⁰ As late as November 1961, FM 17-30, The Armored Division Brigade, in a section on combat in difficult terrain, devoted a fourteen-line paragraph to combat in woods, swamp, and lake areas. Here it was stated that armored units should bypass, neutralize by fire, or let infantry clear difficult terrain.¹¹

The basic armored tactical manual of the 1960s, FM 17-1, Armor Operations, Small Units, devoted only six paragraphs to jungle operations.¹² During the Vietnam era, existing doctrine was modified for that conflict similar to the way doctrine today is modified for OOTW. Tactics set for the employment of cavalry in rear area security missions proved useful for LIC in Vietnam. Road security, base defense, reactions forces, and convoy escort were all described.¹³

FM 17-1 included discussions of base camps, tailoring forces for specific missions, encirclement, and ambushes. The overriding problem of the Vietnam conflict was that the Army did not foresee a whole theater of operations without a front line or a secure rear area.¹⁴

Following Vietnam, armor doctrine again remained fixed on major regional conflicts. Examination of armor platoon through division doctrine indicates that the Cold War era priorities ignored LIC doctrine and Vietnam experience.

FM 71-100 Division Operations

The Army's capstone manual for division operations is designed to assist division commanders and their staff in planning and conducting

combat operations from high to low intensity. Compatible with the previous FM 100-5, based on the Airland Battle concepts, it does not entirely reflect all current concepts because it was written before the 1994 version of FM 100-5. FM 71-100, Division Operations, states that LIC is the most likely type of combat to occur, and high intensity, although potentially catastrophic, the least likely.¹⁵

Following this introduction, the manual devotes entire chapters to offense, defense, and other large scale operations, but only an appendix to LIC. Within this appendix FM 71-100 states that armored forces are not normally suited for use as a maneuver combat element, because their capabilities decrease and vulnerabilities increase in operations involving restricted terrain or counterinsurgency environments.¹⁶

Building on the doctrine outlined in FM 71-100, the Armor School developed a series of manuals to provide training guidelines from the brigade down to the platoon. These include: FM 17-15, Tank Platoon, FM 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company, FM 71-2, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force, and FM 71-3, Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade. Together these field manuals describe how the tank platoon through armored brigade conduct tactical missions.

Each manual, except FM 17-15, Tank Platoon, has seven chapters which are introduction, command & control, offense, defense, other large scale operations, combat support, and combat service support. FM 17-15, Tank Platoon, omits the combat service support chapter. FM 71-3 and FM 71-2 discuss heavy-light imperatives and missions in LIC, but state that in such environments it is tactically advantageous to use light

forces.¹⁷ These manuals do discuss LIC operations, but address armored forces only in the context of supporting light infantry.

Respective Mission Training Plans (MTP) are tied to these field manuals. These MTPs outline tasks, conditions, and standards for every tactical mission to include critical and leader tasks necessary to successfully execute each mission. The information, outlined in the previous field manuals, details every collective and individual task that an armor unit may conduct. Combined with the precision crew and section gunnery tables found in FM 17-12-1, Tank Gunnery, units are provided with clearly defined technical tasks, conditions, and standards that apply to war and OOTW.

General OOTW Doctrine

The next category of doctrine is that written to support a unit preparing to conduct an OOTW mission. Because OOTW is a recently updated acronym, this study also examines documentation supporting LIC to include: TRADOC Pamphlet 525-56, Planners Guide for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW); FM 7-98, Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict; FM 100-20, Military Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict; FM 90-8, Counterquerilla Operations; and FM 100-23, Peace Operations.

The emphasis of this examination is twofold: first to determine the availability of OOTW supporting doctrine, and second to examine this doctrine for specific consideration of armored, or heavy mechanized force mission employment.

Tradoc Pamphlet 525-56
Planners Guide for Military Operations Other Than War

Published in September 1993, Tradoc Pamphlet 525-56 was written to assist planners at all levels in identifying the critical factors that must be considered in order to successfully accomplish a military operation other than war (MOOTW).¹⁸

Chapter One identifies and defines what are termed as "operational categories" which include contingency operations, combating terrorism, support to insurgency/counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, and support to counter-drug operations. Chapter Two identifies the functional areas and their associated tasks. These are the tasks considered to be common to all of the operational categories discussed in chapter one, and are written only in general terms. In addition to the thirteen activities listed in FM 100-5, Operations, this pamphlet also discusses tasks associated with recovery operations, freedom of navigation, shipping protection, restore order, maritime intercept, and quarantine operations. Designed even with checklists for planners, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-56, although straying from the activities listed in FM 100-5, provides detailed information on what, who and how to conduct MOOTW.

These details, although not specific to an armored force, stand as a sound checklist for a unit preparing for a MOOTW.

FM 100-20/AF Pamphlet 3-20
Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict

Written for both the Army and Air Force, FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, describes the complexities of

operating in a LIC environment. Not entirely aligned with FM 100-5, Operations, FM 100-20 discusses four major types of operations; support for insurgency and counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and peacetime operations. It also explains the difference between LIC and other conventional operations.

FM 100-20 lists the LIC imperatives as political dominance, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy, and perseverance. These imperatives appear very similarly as current accepted principles of OOTW. Although FM 100-20 lists only these five, the remaining activities of OOTW are found scattered throughout the manual as subordinate missions.

Designed as a dual force manual, FM 100-20/AFP 3-20 does not detail information specific to a heavy ground or mechanized force. Discussing the organization for tactical operations, the manual only states to use appropriate firepower and mobility.¹⁹ The manual goes on to outline potential tactical missions and indicates that units should prepare for a wide variety of them to include raids, ambushes, movement to contact, exploitation and pursuit, attack, and defend. Clearly these missions have direct application to an armored force.

FM 7-98, Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict

Published by the Infantry School in 1992, FM 7-98 covers much of the same information as FM 100-20, but includes many more specifics, particularly for an infantry or light force. Written to the brigade and battalion level, it gives tactical guidance for planning, controlling, and coordinating LIC operations. FM 7-98 explicitly lists the combat

critical tasks and missions of units operating in a LIC environment. Also varying from FM 100-5, Operations, FM 7-98 lists the same imperatives and operational categories found in FM 100-20. FM 7-98 devotes separate chapters to discussing combat support and combat service support. Although not addressing armor or mechanized units specifically, the manual does discuss potential employment of attack helicopters, air defense systems, and artillery. Appendix C, Operations and Techniques, notes that with minor changes, techniques found in armor tactical manuals, such as FM 71-1 and FM 71-2, Tank Company/Battalion Operations, also apply to counterinsurgency and Counter guerrilla warfare.

Although FM 7-98, Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict, is not completely aligned to the updated FM 100-5, Operations, it does provide extensive detailed information critical to any force preparing to conduct an OOTW.

FM 100-23, Peace Operations

Published in December 1994, FM 100-23 directly links itself to current doctrinal tenants, principles, and activities found in FM 100-5, Operations.

The manual gives guidance for the full range of peace operations to include peacemaking, peace building, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement, and serves as the foundation for future tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). FM 100-23 outlines command and control and liaison responsibilities, mission planning considerations, and logistics. Additionally, being a recent publication, it includes

lessons learned from the former Yugoslavia, the Dominican Republic, and ROE examples from Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.

Like the previous manuals, FM 100-20 does not provide detailed information for the use of armor. The manual does state, however, that armor may play major roles in peace enforcement and be useful in peacekeeping where threats exist by conducting operations, such as force protections, deterrence, convoy escort, and mobile reserves.²⁰

FM 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations

FM 90-8 provides information to brigade and lower commanders and staff on concepts and doctrine concerning the conduct of counterguerrilla operations. Limited not just to insurgencies, the manual also discusses counterguerrilla operations in a conventional conflict environment.

The FM states that the primary role of the military in such an operation is to provide internal security to enable the host nation to pursue its national objectives.²¹ It does go on, however, to devote an entire chapter to combat and combat units, to include specific roles and missions for armor and armored cavalry units. Although one of the few manuals that specifically addresses armored forces, it does contend that such forces are not particularly suited for use as a maneuver unit in a counterinsurgency environment.²²

Call Publications

The most current and updated information concerning OOTW is found in publications from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). Produced and distributed at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, CALL publications

are written to provide lessons and perceptions from units involved in military exercises, activities, and real world events. The intent of the publications is to expeditiously share current knowledge and impart lessons learned. CALL publications, which are Department of the Army (DA) approved, include monthly newsletters, training center bulletins, and special edition handbooks.

Monthly newsletters highlight lessons learned from recent OOTW missions to include Somalia, Haiti, and northern Iraq. Examples of the articles contained in these newsletters include dealing with mine threats, employing snipers, heavy-light MOUT operations, and cordon and search. Armor specific lessons are also outlined and discuss the use of tanks in such missions as peacekeeping and peace enforcement. These articles highlight armor employment methods and reinforce the point that armor can make significant contributions in OOTW operations due to the tank's potent weapon systems and its ability to provide long and close range support for infantry.²³

These handbooks provide TTP's which are easy to read, understand, and outline exact methods for soldiers and leaders preparing for or currently conducting an OOTW. The July 1994 special edition handbook was published specifically for soldiers operating in OOTW. This thorough handbook outlines OOTW operations, provides TTP, discusses preventive medicine issues, and provides OOTW checklists for ROE, base defense, and crowd control. Special Edition Handbook 93-1, published in January 1993, provided insight into the Somalia mission and included TTP for many tasks to include route reconnaissance, vehicle survival, and tactical mobility.²⁴

Together these publications from CALL, provide soldiers, leaders, and units accurate information and insights into the complex arena of OOTW. These publications, combined with current doctrine, stand as a solid, current information base to help prepare and guide a unit through an OOTW mission.

Future Doctrine

The diversity of OOTW, combined with recent deployments on numerous such missions, leaves Army doctrine struggling to keep pace. The mere insertion of OOTW into the Army's capstone manual FM 100-5, Operations, causes an misalignment, however slight, of all its supporting doctrine. CALL publications provide current information to fill this void, but what does future doctrine look like?

FM 100-20, Military Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict
FM 100-20, "Operations Other Than War" (Draft)

FM 100-20, formerly Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, is under revision with a new title of Operations Other Than War. The manual supersedes the 1990 version, and aligns itself with the principles and activities of OOTW found in FM 100-5, Operations.

Tradoc Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations

Examining future war fighting, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) published TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations. This publication describes the conceptual foundation of war-fighting and OOTW in the early decades of the twenty-first century.²⁵ It looks at how the Army will function in this environment as part of a joint team or coalition force.

The chapters outline challenges of future war fighting, strategic environments, and land-based operations. Emphasizing battle space, high technology, and information-based operations, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, is truly a forward looking document.

On the subject of training for OOTW, the pamphlet states that "units will continue to concentrate training on the METL; however, elements of that will change to meet diverse future combat and OOTW scenarios."²⁶

The nature of doctrine is change. It represents guidelines and procedures to support units conducting a wide variety of missions, and, as these missions change, so must the supporting doctrine. OOTW, representative of this change, is slowly finding its way into Army publications. Previous TTP, principles and tenets, are being revised to reflect the updates to current doctrine.

Increasing roles and missions, updates in technology, and conceptual war fighting, requires reciprocal updates to doctrine. FM 100-20, OOTW, and TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, represent the movement toward that change.

Endnotes

¹U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1993), 1-1.

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⁵*Ibid.*, 13.

⁶*Ibid.*

⁷FM 100-5., iv.

⁸*Ibid.*, vi.

⁹*Ibid.*, 13-0.

¹⁰Donn A. Starry, "Mounted Combat in Vietnam," Battle Analysis Series, volume II, US Army in Vietnam, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS., 7.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 8.

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¹³*Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁵U.S. Army, FM 71-100, Division Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1990), iii.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, B-4.

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¹⁹U.S. Army, FM 100-20, Military Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict (Washington: Department of the Army, 1990), E-19.

²⁰U.S. Army, FM 100-23, Peace Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1994), 40.

²¹U.S. Army, FM 90-8, Counterquerrilla Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1986), 1-8.

²²Ibid., 5-6.

²³US Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Newsletter No. 93-8, Operations Other Than War - Peace Operations, (December 1993), XII-1.

²⁴U.S. Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Special Edition Handbook, Somalia, (January 1993), 13.

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²⁶Ibid., 4-3.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

US Army armored forces remain ready to conduct both war and OOTW. RMA states that the traditional ways of waging war will give way to dramatic new forms of "High-Technology" combat and increased forms of irregular warfare. Conventional clashes of modern armies continue giving way to guerrilla conflicts, irregular wars, terrorism, and non-state conflicts.¹ This situation leaves the US unable to make any decisive assumptions about the precise enemies or conflicts it will face during the next two decades.² Therefore, in order to remain ready for such a range of military operations, the Army, and particularly armored forces, must be adaptable enough to provide tactics, techniques, and procedures for a full spectrum of such operations.

OOTW is by no means a new concept to the Army or armored forces. Since the creation of the US military, its forces have participated in a full spectrum of activities from nation building, to peacekeeping, to full-scale war. The historical analysis chapter clearly indicates that in addition to full-scale war, armored forces remain key players in OOTW. Recent examples include Operation Just Cause in Panama, Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, and this year during Operation Uphold/Restore Democracy in Haiti. Since armored forces participate in OOTW, and all indications point toward a continued and possibly an increased role, does current training and doctrine properly support unit preparation?

The end of the Cold War spelled the end of a simpler approach to training. Unit missions and METL that once reflected known enemy equipment, capabilities, and locations must now reflect a focus on war-fighting and remain adaptable to OOTW. Discussing these ever growing military requirements, R. James Woolsey, the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, said, "Yes, we have slain a large dragon, but we live now in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes. And in many ways, the dragon was easier to keep track of."

The Army's capstone training manuals FM 25-100, Training The Force, and FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training describe the approach to training as "War" or "Battle Focused." This approach provides today's forces with a solid platform from which to launch into both a full-scale war and also peacekeeping or counterinsurgency operations. The critical aspect of training for OOTW remains focused on the unit leadership, primarily the commander and staff. For here lie the majority of the non-METL tasks critical to a units success in OOTW.

Two key points are evident as a result of the doctrinal analysis. First, because OOTW has only recently been inserted into the Army's capstone war fighting manual FM 100-5, Operations, most of the supporting doctrine still aligns to older concepts such as LIC, and Airland Battle. This holds true for armored and mechanized forces doctrine supporting platoon-through-division level operations.

The second and more important discovery is that armored doctrine that supports war-fighting has direct application to OOTW. The 71 series field manuals, combined with their supporting MTP's, provide TTP

for the majority of tasks an armored force must conduct during an OOTW. The OOTW specific training tasks, such as peace building or city demilitarization, although not contained within armor specific doctrine, are found in a variety of other sources.

Recent increases in OOTW missions have brought to light many new training tasks now associated specifically with OOTW. But analysis of these tasks indicates they also have direct application to war. The skills necessary to work in particular regions with varying cultures deal with belligerent factions while relating with the media are important to understand, and they have the same effects whether the operation is an OOTW or full scale war. Additionally, principles of war, tenets of army operations, and dynamics of combat power continue to provide planners with sound encompassing checklists for both major regional contingencies and non-combat operations.

Security, roadblocks, and convoy escort are tasks associated with armored units conducting OOTW. The ability to conduct these tasks falls comfortably within the capabilities of the tank company and battalion. Unique to OOTW are the circumstances within which that tank battalion must operate. A peacekeeping force that finds itself in a cross fire between warring factions must respond very differently than it would in combat. Less fire power and more mental flexibility take the place of battle drills and overwhelming fire power employing all combat multipliers.

Armored forces, designed and created to shock with overwhelming fire power, have proven themselves equally capable in operations requiring restraint and limited combat. Unit training supports both war

and OOTW, doctrine provides the guidelines within which to operate, and leaders today see the Army tenet of "versatility" requiring increased attention. While armored forces remain ready for their primary mission--to fight and win the nations wars--they also stand ready for the complex spectrum of missions associated with OOTW.

Endnotes

¹Michael Mazarr, The Revolution of Military Affairs
(Carlisle: US Army War College, 1994), 4.

²Ibid., 8.

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